of Houthi leaders, and also injured hundreds
more. At around the same time, a fifth mujāhid
carried out an operation in Sa’dah, targeting a
Houthi government building and detonating
his explosives. Only days after the operations,
the Americans announced that they had pulled
the last of their special forces out of Yemen.
These operations brought back memories of the
blessed attacks ordered by Shaykh Abū Mus’ab
az-Zarqāwī (rahimahullāh), targeting the Iraqi
Rāfidah and killing their cleric Muhammad Bāqir
al-Hakīm.
On the heels of this blessed operation in Sanaa and
Sa’dah, the Yemenī branch of al-Qā’idah came out
and exposed its two-faced nature by denouncing
the attack and reaffirming their adherence to
Dhawāhiri’s guidelines, as if to imply that the
Islamic State’s operation was carried out against
Sunnis in a public place of gathering not specific
to the Houthis, when in reality the opposite was
true. When one contrasts this blessed operation
with al-Qā’idah’s attack on a Houthi rally in Tahrir
Square in Sanaa last fall, the blatant hypocrisy
becomes evident: Is it permissible for Al-Qa’idah
–
according to Dhaw
ā
hiri’s feeble guidelines –
to bomb a Houthi rally in a public square, but
forbidden for the Islamic State to bomb a Houthi
gathering in a Houthi temple? Or is this distinction
based on blind partisanship?
May Allah accept all those mujāhidīn who fight,
massacre, and terrorize the kuffār while not
differentiating between them under the influence
of irjā’ or on the grounds of nationalism